Reform of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) comes around roughly once a decade, and the latest reform cycle is now in full swing. EU Fisheries Ministers have met informally in Vigo, on 4-5 May, to be presented with the Commission’s summary of the public consultation in 2009 and with the orientations stemming from a large stakeholder conference in La Coruña, on 2-3 May.
The CFP’s glaring failures have been recognised by the Commission in its Green Paper, published in April 2009 as a catalyst to the reform process. The CFP has resulted in 88% of assessed European fish stocks being overfished, and 30% being outside safe biological limits – meaning that they are at risk of collapse. If fishing stopped altogether in 2010, more than a fifth of European fish stocks would not be replenished by 2015, according to research conducted last year at the University of Kiel.
In order to find solutions for this state of affairs, the stakeholder conference which preceded the informal Council addressed three issues which Seas At Risk and the OCEAN2012 coalition believe are among the key topics in the reform process.
Governance
Most problems regarding the CFP stem from governance failures. The CFP has long suffered from political haggling and short-termism, with measures of great intricacy being dealt with at the highest political level. Traditionally, national ministers have entangled themselves in debates about issues such as the size of nets and annual quotas. Now, following the Lisbon treaty, the political process also includes the European Parliament in most decisions related to fisheries management. More politicians are, in short, debating issues that do not require political leadership. Urgent technical measures become subject to protracted political discussion.
If European fisheries are to be sustainable, the future CFP must put in place a governance framework that differentiates between long-term (strategic) and operational (management) decisions, with decisions taken and implemented at the most appropriate level. The task of the Council and the Parliament should be to decide on the overarching principles and long-term objectives of the policy; detailed implementation should be left to the Commission or decentralised management bodies.
Access to and management of fish stocks
At present, the CFP allocates access to fish stocks based on the principle of ‘relative stability’, which means that access to stocks is allocated based on individual countries’ historical catches. This model needs to be replaced with one that gives preferential access to fishing resources to those operators who better contribute to the objectives of the CFP, by fishing in an environmentally sustainable and socially responsible manner. Sustainability criteria should also be applied when tackling the deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity: the most destructive vessels should be removed from the fleet first.
Small-scale and coastal fisheries
The so-called “small scale” sector represents about 80% of the number of EU vessels. But, in practice, the CFP has so far focused on the management of and support to the large scale sector, which secures most money, using these subsidies to modernise and fuel their fleets. By contrast, operators of small vessels receive the least EU money, and most of the subsidies they receive are for scrapping their vessels.
Small is not always beautiful, and artisanal and coastal fleets do cause some harm. This is, though, the part of the fishing industry that fishes most sustainably. Socially, too, it is the most important, providing 65% of the industry’s jobs (it provides 30% of the catch).
Looking at the numbers, the state of Europe’s fisheries can seem hopeless. But better management could allow fish stocks to revive and ease the economic plight of coastal communities. EU ministers must accept that the status quo is unsustainable. The reform of the CFP poses an opportunity not to be missed if Europeans want to have their fish... and eat them too.
By Vera Coelho
Tuesday, 11 May 2010
Wednesday, 28 April 2010
Bluefin and the EU: a match not made in heaven
So, it’s been over a month since the CITES conference came to an end. For bluefin tuna lovers, not eaters, the conference was a great disappointment.
The inclusion of Atlantic bluefin tuna on Annex I to the Convention was rejected and European nations could not even vote in the final and most important stage of proceedings; a vote, that if it had been successful, would have effectively meant for a complete ban on trading of bluefin tuna, and would have given this highly prized species a chance to recover.
On the basis that scientific evidence made such a ban so self evident, it is important to reflect on why the European political system could not stand up for this endangered species.
EARLY OPTIMISM
At first, many were hopeful when the EU agreed on a common position supporting a ban of bluefin tuna trade shortly before the beginning of the CITES conference. However, there was also skepticism in that the EU position came with stringent conditions. In this, instead of supporting an immediate, complete, worldwide ban, the EU position only supported a ban of industrial fishing of bluefin tuna to come into effect sometime in the future, and only once it had been proven again that bluefin tuna is indeed on its way to extinction. Reading further into this, in essence the EU was indirectly trying to change the rules of the CITES game and indeed, before the meeting, it was perceived as highly questionable whether the conditional position would be acceptable under the terms of CITES.
The very outcome and failure of the CITES meeting to ban trade of bluefin tuna in many ways provides us with the answer to this political conundrum.
WEAKNESS
The weak EU position also raised questions about the benefit of having a common EU position at such meetings.
The EU is not a member of CITES, the individual member states are. With the common EU position, the 27 member states lost their right to promote their individual position on the listing and had to represent the common EU position. In a situation where a majority of member states would have supported a complete ban without conditions this would possibly have had a stronger persuasive effect on other CITES members than the weak EU position had.
Again, things are never as clear cut as they appear and this issue take us to the very foundation of the EU; the Lisbon Treaty.
SHARES FARE?
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, fisheries were under the exclusive mandate of the EU. If the EU did not act, the matter remained unregulated and member states could not intervene. Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this is no longer the case.
Fisheries are now largely a shared competence, meaning that the EU shall only act when the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states but can be better achieved at EU level. In the absence of EU measures, member states may act individually.
However, to make things (even) less clear, not all fisheries matters are now a shared competence. Issues relating to the conservation of marine biological resources remain an exclusive competence of the EU but it has not been finally resolved yet, whether the inclusion of a species such as the bluefin tuna on Annex I would fall within the scope of this exception.
Whatever the outcome, the whole fiasco surrounding the call for a listing of bluefin tuna means the EU and its members states need not only to reflect on why, in the end, such a pitiful response was made, but also to evaluate what must be done when a similar situation is apparent. Let’s just hope that when that situation arises it is a positive outcome for a united European front, but also a positive one for bluefin and other species so desperately needing protection.
By Maja-Alexandra Dittel
The inclusion of Atlantic bluefin tuna on Annex I to the Convention was rejected and European nations could not even vote in the final and most important stage of proceedings; a vote, that if it had been successful, would have effectively meant for a complete ban on trading of bluefin tuna, and would have given this highly prized species a chance to recover.
On the basis that scientific evidence made such a ban so self evident, it is important to reflect on why the European political system could not stand up for this endangered species.
EARLY OPTIMISM
At first, many were hopeful when the EU agreed on a common position supporting a ban of bluefin tuna trade shortly before the beginning of the CITES conference. However, there was also skepticism in that the EU position came with stringent conditions. In this, instead of supporting an immediate, complete, worldwide ban, the EU position only supported a ban of industrial fishing of bluefin tuna to come into effect sometime in the future, and only once it had been proven again that bluefin tuna is indeed on its way to extinction. Reading further into this, in essence the EU was indirectly trying to change the rules of the CITES game and indeed, before the meeting, it was perceived as highly questionable whether the conditional position would be acceptable under the terms of CITES.
The very outcome and failure of the CITES meeting to ban trade of bluefin tuna in many ways provides us with the answer to this political conundrum.
WEAKNESS
The weak EU position also raised questions about the benefit of having a common EU position at such meetings.
The EU is not a member of CITES, the individual member states are. With the common EU position, the 27 member states lost their right to promote their individual position on the listing and had to represent the common EU position. In a situation where a majority of member states would have supported a complete ban without conditions this would possibly have had a stronger persuasive effect on other CITES members than the weak EU position had.
Again, things are never as clear cut as they appear and this issue take us to the very foundation of the EU; the Lisbon Treaty.
SHARES FARE?
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, fisheries were under the exclusive mandate of the EU. If the EU did not act, the matter remained unregulated and member states could not intervene. Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this is no longer the case.
Fisheries are now largely a shared competence, meaning that the EU shall only act when the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states but can be better achieved at EU level. In the absence of EU measures, member states may act individually.
However, to make things (even) less clear, not all fisheries matters are now a shared competence. Issues relating to the conservation of marine biological resources remain an exclusive competence of the EU but it has not been finally resolved yet, whether the inclusion of a species such as the bluefin tuna on Annex I would fall within the scope of this exception.
Whatever the outcome, the whole fiasco surrounding the call for a listing of bluefin tuna means the EU and its members states need not only to reflect on why, in the end, such a pitiful response was made, but also to evaluate what must be done when a similar situation is apparent. Let’s just hope that when that situation arises it is a positive outcome for a united European front, but also a positive one for bluefin and other species so desperately needing protection.
By Maja-Alexandra Dittel
Monday, 21 December 2009
Copenhagen fails on bunkers
In the end COP15 produced no progress whatsoever on bunker emissions or finance; in fact the texts to come out of the meeting do not even mention them. At the start of negotiations to addresses these emissions at IMO the EU made it clear that if there was no global action taken then it would prepare regional measures of its own. The EU didn't push hard enough for a fair, ambitious and binding agreement in Copenhagen but they have probably done everthing that could reasonably be expected of them to get global measures on bunker emissions and they now have a green light for regional mesures and in particular the inclusion of emissions from ships visiting EU ports in an EU emissions trading scheme.
Friday, 18 December 2009
Little news, no progress
Despite informal negotiator level drafting group meetings yesterday there has been little progress on the bunker issue. Saudi Arabia and others overnight refused to allow further "informals", suggesting instead that the issue be left to ministers. There remains many differences of opinion in the draft text and it is unclear what ministers could do with it in its present form. With only a handful of environment NGOs people still in the conference centre the information coming out of the negotiations has slowed but what there is suggests that the negotiations are still a long way from agreement on bunkers (and indeed many of the other issues) and that time is running out.
Thursday, 17 December 2009
Come on EU
In a press release issued in the last hour Environment NGOs have responded to the recent Norway proposal by calling on the EU to fight back with the least developed countries and others who still believe that a strong deal is both necessary and possible.
Norway’s proposal sends responsibility for action on bunkers back to ICAO and IMO without any sense of urgency or commitment to absolute reduction targets other than a vague reference to keeping warming below 2 degrees. There is also no reference to the pivotal role that bunker revenues can play in climate finance. Norway’s proposal risks continued inaction and political paralysis. The whole idea of raising the aviation and shipping issue in Copenhagen was to use the occasion of wider negotiations to break the political deadlock and agree a fast track to introduce reduction measures. That chance is now slipping away as is the likelihood of releasing billions of dollars of urgently needed additional climate finance.
In order to break the bunkers deadlock, environmental NGOs call on:
* All delegations to act on the urgency of the situation and have Copenhagen link early global action to reduce bunker emissions to a significant program of climate finance for developing countries.
* The Copenhagen Agreement to set the level of ambition, the framework for revenue distribution and a fast track timeline to agree on global measures in ICAO and IMO.
* The United States to declare its willingness to use revenues from bunker mitigation as climate finance. Such a declaration from the USA would quickly trigger a developed country (Annex 1) offer of climate finance in return for global bunker mitigation.
* Emerging economies to agree to participate in a global bunker mitigation process or see regional measures imposed by the EU and USA without any access to the revenues generated.
* Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to support bunker measures on the condition that routes to their countries will be exempted and revenues will flow to the most vulnerable states.
* Latin American countries to accept that any trade impacts will be low for them and, in any case, more than compensated by access to climate financing.
* OPEC to support bunker measures provided a proportion of revenues are used for clean technologies within the sector.
Norway’s proposal sends responsibility for action on bunkers back to ICAO and IMO without any sense of urgency or commitment to absolute reduction targets other than a vague reference to keeping warming below 2 degrees. There is also no reference to the pivotal role that bunker revenues can play in climate finance. Norway’s proposal risks continued inaction and political paralysis. The whole idea of raising the aviation and shipping issue in Copenhagen was to use the occasion of wider negotiations to break the political deadlock and agree a fast track to introduce reduction measures. That chance is now slipping away as is the likelihood of releasing billions of dollars of urgently needed additional climate finance.
In order to break the bunkers deadlock, environmental NGOs call on:
* All delegations to act on the urgency of the situation and have Copenhagen link early global action to reduce bunker emissions to a significant program of climate finance for developing countries.
* The Copenhagen Agreement to set the level of ambition, the framework for revenue distribution and a fast track timeline to agree on global measures in ICAO and IMO.
* The United States to declare its willingness to use revenues from bunker mitigation as climate finance. Such a declaration from the USA would quickly trigger a developed country (Annex 1) offer of climate finance in return for global bunker mitigation.
* Emerging economies to agree to participate in a global bunker mitigation process or see regional measures imposed by the EU and USA without any access to the revenues generated.
* Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to support bunker measures on the condition that routes to their countries will be exempted and revenues will flow to the most vulnerable states.
* Latin American countries to accept that any trade impacts will be low for them and, in any case, more than compensated by access to climate financing.
* OPEC to support bunker measures provided a proportion of revenues are used for clean technologies within the sector.
Bunkers in the news
This morning has seen a flurry of press interest in the bunkers issue at Copenhagen, with stories on Reuters, in The Australian national daily, and in the UK's Daily Telegraph. Gordon Brown and Richard Branson are reported as supporting action on bunkers. While Reuters is down beat, the others suggest a deal is still possible. More general reporting on the summit this morning is gloomy and the chance of bunkers bucking the trend diminished last night with the appearance of an extremely weak proposal from Norway. More on this later.
Wednesday, 16 December 2009
Bunkers a late finisher?
The general feeling about the talks is gloomy to say the least but hope remains that bunkers mitigation, helped by its potential to raise funds for climate adaptation, may rise to the surface of the talks and provide ministers and heads of state with a success story. While the actual negotiations have disappeared into the hallowed halls of ministers and heads of state and taken the old negotiator's text with them, the issue is increasingly visible in the comments and publications of key players in the talks. Bunkers remains high on the agenda of the host country and COP15 President, the EU presidency today described fees from maritime and aviation as "crucial" for a climate deal, and the French jointly with Ethiopia (representing the Africa Group) have called for "taxes on sea freight or air transport". A number of obstacles remain, but the future of the bunkers issue now almost certainly lies with ministers and heads of state and the intersecting of a number of other elements of the negotiations.
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